Contents

ISSBD SPECIAL SECTION
CULTURE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIONS

1
Introduction to Culture and the Development of Emotions. Joan G. Miller and Xinyin Chen

1
Development of Emotions as Organized by Culture. Gisela Trommsdorff

5
Capturing the Culture in the Cultural Socialization of Emotion. Pamela M. Cole and Patricia Z. Tan

8
Developing Emotion Knowledge in Cultural Contexts. Qi Wang

12
The Development of Emotional Expressivity and the Influence of Culture. Linda A. Campos and Serah S. Fotani

15
Commentary: Universals and Cultural Influences on Emotional Life. Michael Lewis

17
Commentary: Cultural Influences on Emotional Development: So Much to Do, So Little Time. Nancy Eisenberg

18
Commentary: Emotion Studied in Cultural Developmental Psychology. James A. Russell

18
Notes from the President

23
Memoir: Giyoo Hatano

24
Major Conferences of Interest
Introduction to Culture and the Development of Emotions

Joan G. Miller
Department of Psychology, New School for Social Research
New York, N.Y., USA
E-mail: millerj@newschool.edu

and

Xinyin Chen
Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada
E-mail: xchen@uwo.ca

The cross-cultural development of emotions constitutes an intriguing area for developmental theory and research. Emotions involve bodily experiences even as they also reflect culturally based conceptual outlooks and practices. The examination of culture and emotion development provides insight not only into the nature of emotion itself but also into commonalities and differences in child development.

The essays and commentaries in this Special Section address central conceptual and methodological issues in understanding culture and emotion development and in working toward the creation of a more culturally informed developmental psychology. Consideration is given to cross-cultural developmental patterns observed in a wide range of areas of emotion development, including the meaning of particular emotions, patterns of emotional expressiveness, emotion knowledge, and emotion regulation. Insight is also provided into the socialization processes through which emotional experiences are constructed, with attention paid to culturally variable patterns of emotion talk and social interaction and to contrasting socialization goals for the child that are emphasized in different cultural communities. Based on longitudinal research, the authors discuss possible predictors of later emerging child competencies and the extent to which the adaptive significance of particular patterns of emotional responding differs or remains the same cross-culturally. More generally, broader conceptual implications are drawn regarding the need to understand emotions in more dynamic and culturally sensitive terms. Examination is also undertaken of methodological and disciplinary challenges entailed in adopting more process-oriented approaches to culture and in bringing a more culturally informed outlook to developmental research.

The authors and commentators represent a highly distinguished international group of scholars who have made seminal contributions to the issues under consideration. Their contributions to the Special Section speak to the rich theoretical and empirical insights provided by work in this area and to the many unanswered and intriguing questions that await further study.

Development of Emotions as Organized by Culture

Gisela Trommsdorff
Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz
Konstanz, Germany
E-mail: Gisela.Trommsdorff@uni-konstanz.de

Emotions can be seen as both biologically prepared and socio-culturally shaped. Evidence on cultural differences in manifestations of emotions abound; however, the role of culture in emotion development has not yet been systematically studied and integrated in a theory on the socialization of emotions. Emotion development includes the understanding of emotions and their meaning, appraisal of emotion-evoking situations, knowledge of appropriate emotion expression, and regulation of emotions. Emotion development and emotion regulation are bi-directionally influential through the development of links between emotions and cognition, and the emerging coherent patterns of emotions, cognitions, and regulatory behavior (Saarni, 1999). Research on the socialization and development of emotions and regulation usually focuses on parenting (warmth, sensitivity) and family (e.g., emotional expressivity) (e.g., Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992; Saarni, 1999) and is restricted to European-American samples.

The cultural organization of emotion development is assumed here to be related to the prevailing cultural model of self-construal—the independent or the interdependent self. In many Western cultures, the model of independence dominates, regarding the self as an independent, separate organism. In contrast, in many non-Western cultures the cultural model of interdependence prevails, defining the self by social relationships (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). While both independence and interdependence are
universal values, there is between- and within-culture variation in their relative importance. Persons with an independent self-construal experience and express their emotions as internal personal characteristics striving for autonomy and individualistic self-assertion. Person with an interdependent self-construal experience and express emotions as a means for maintaining interpersonal harmony rather than as an authentic representation of emotions; they view emotions as part of self-other relationships, reflecting social reality rather than inner personal experiences (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). Thus, the prevailing cultural model of the self assumed influences the appraisal, experience, expression, regulation, and developmental pathways of emotions.

To give an example of cultural differences in the meaning of emotions, in Western cultures, positive and negative emotions are usually seen as being in opposition to each other while in Asian cultures positive and negative emotions can coexist as complementary components (positively correlating) (Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000; Miller & Bersoff, 1995). When the meaning of positive emotions is based on the cultural model of the independent self, happiness is often related to ego-focused, socially “disengaging emotions” (individual success, autonomy; self-esteem; pride). When the model of the interdependent self prevails, positive emotions are often experienced as interpersonally “engaging emotions” (success in tasks of interdependence, good social relations) (see Kitayama, 2001, for comparisons of US and Japanese samples).

This difference in cultural meanings has consequences for the assumption of culturally invariant patterns of appraisal in self-conscious emotions such as pride and shame. According to the cultural model of the independent self, a positive self-conscious emotion in the context of independence is pride. “Pride . . . signals and reinforces the accomplishments of the independent self. . . . Pride is one of the emotions that best predicts general well-being in Western samples” (Mesquita & Karasawa, 2004, p. 162). Pride signals a disengaged emotion characterized by independence in achieving identity-goal congruence. In contrast, according to the cultural model of the interdependent self, positive emotions are defined through socially engaged emotions based on connectedness to other people and adjustment to social relationships. Identity-goal congruence is achieved by maintaining harmony in the group, and promoting group-members’ goals (focusing on avoidance of interpersonal conflict). Therefore, pride is only evaluated as a positive emotion when one’s achievements serve others’ goals or when success is not attributed to the self but to the joint efforts of the group (social honor) (Markus & Kitayama, 2002). Otherwise, pride indicates an undesirable, isolating social distance between the self and others.

In the cultural model of independence, shame is a negative emotion reducing self-esteem. In contrast, in cultures favoring an interdependent self, shame is a positive emotion which indicates social engagement, relatedness, striving for social conformity, and motivation to perform better in the future; this underlines the preference of self-critical, continuous effort (Mesquita & Karasawa, 2004). Therefore, different from the independent self construal, pride does not fit with the interdependent self-construal but shame does. Shame is a socially engaged, positive, and more articulated emotion for Chinese children, while for US children shame signals failure to achieve self-esteem, a major task of independence. Accordingly, the development of pride- and shame-related emotions (appraisal and action components) differs for US and Chinese persons (Mascolo, Fischer, & Li, 2003).

Similarly, the expression of anger is discouraged in Asian cultures since it threatens relationship harmony while anger is tolerated in the US as part of self-assertion (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Zahn-Waxler, Friedman, Cole, Mizuta & Hiruma, 1996). Intra- and intercultural comparisons by Cole, Bruschi, and Tamang (2002) showed that the appraisal of anger-evoking situations by Brahman and US children appeared to be similar, while Brahman (Nepal) children refrained more from communicating anger in line with values of interdependence. Tamang (Nepal) children appraised situations such that they even did not feel anger. Thus, even though their appraisal differed, Nepali children acted in accordance with the cultural model of interdependence (and secondary control); this is in contrast to the model of independence (and primary control) in the US which encourages children’s expression of anger. This and other studies underline the role of religious beliefs as influencing children’s emotion development (Weisz, Weiss, Walter, Suwanlert, Chaiyasit & Anderson, 1988, for Buddhist influence).

Given these cultural differences, it seems fruitful to go beyond the dichotomy of positive and negative emotions and differentiate between socially “engaging” (other-focused) and “disengaging” (self-focused) emotions and their respective associations with independent/interdependent self-construal and related psychological processes such as autonomy/relatedness, or primary/secondary control.

This culture-specificity in the organization of emotional experience according to independent and interdependent self-construal (including moral emotions such as happiness when fulfilling one’s duty; Miller & Bersoff, 1995) suggests effects from different socialization processes. For example, praise has often been regarded an important aspect of parenting in Western contexts since it should foster positive self-regard in the child via emotions of pride. However, in cultures where pride indicates a disengaged (negative) emotion, parents may restrict praising to situations when the child shows socially engaged behavior based on sensitivity to other’s expectations in line with values of interdependence.

Another example is the assumption that the open expression of emotions (e.g., early family emotional discourse) fosters children’s emotional competence. This assumption may not apply in cultures where the open expression of emotions is inhibited in favor of concern for others. Thus, whether inhibition of emotions signals problematic emotion development needs to be evaluated in relation to the cultural model of the self and related socialization of autonomy/relatedness and empathy. In Western cultures, the expression of emotions is usually considered an act of authentic self-presentation while in many non-Western cultures the modulation or inhibition of emotional expression is socialized and motivated by a concern for social consequences (emotions as inner state versus interpersonal experience). For example, Chinese do not differ from American adults in their physiological reactions but
usually show a lower frequency, intensity, and duration in the expression of emotions. This may be due to their respective socialization experiences according to different models of self. Chinese as compared to US mothers value harmonious and balanced social interactions as goal for emotion development and regulation more highly (Wang & Fivush, 2005): Among mother-child dyads in the US, conversations about past experiences of negative emotions indicate that children are socialized to develop an autonomous sense of self and regulate negative emotions through emotional understanding. In contrast, conversations of Chinese dyads reveal that emotion regulation is based on relatedness and acceptance of social norms. Such differences in socialization have consequences, for example, for the inhibition of ego-based anger expression due to the social need for harmony and related sensitivity for other’s expectations in cultures where the interdependent self-construal prevails.

Related cultural differences in socialization of emotions can be expected with respect to attachment—a basic aspect of parent-child relationships. Cultures differing in the model of the self and the manifestation of emotions can be assumed to also differ in caretakers’ sensitivity and children’s development. In their critical discussion of attachment theoretical assumptions, Rothbaum, Weisz, Pott, Miyake, and Morelli (2000) have pointed out the culture-specific meaning of the caretaker’s sensitivity and its respective function for the child’s development. Mothers’ sensitivity and related success in regulating their children’s emotions (reducing distress) varies according to the cultural context. For example, Japanese mothers’ pro-active sensitivity (anticipation-guided; soothing the infant before she signals negative emotions) allows for more effective emotion regulation than does German mothers’ reactive sensitivity (responsiveness) (Friedlmeier & Trommsdorff, 1999; Trommsdorff & Friedlmeier, 1993). This pro-active sensitivity can be seen as the basis for the development of the interdependent self-construal and related emotion development (Trommsdorff & Kornadt, 2003; Rothbaum & Trommsdorff, in press).

These results indicate culture-specific paths in the development of emotions and regulation, including different functions of interpersonal in contrast to intra-personal regulation. This partly contradicts the often repeated assumption that emotion regulation develops first interpersonally (the caretaker initiating the regulation) and later is replaced by intra-personal regulation (Thompson, 1994). However, in cultures favoring the interdependent self-construal, emotion regulation follows the goal of accommodating the expectations of relevant other persons (secondary in contrast to primary control). The development of emotion regulation in these cultures is a process of (internalized) interpersonal co-regulation based on empathy and anticipation as part of the interdependent self-construal. In contrast, caretakers’ socialization strategies to promote intra-personal self-regulation characterize the developmental path for the independent self.

These examples illustrate that culture-specificities of emotion development may enrich existing theoretical approaches. However, we are still far from a culturally-informed science of the socialization of emotions. One reason is methodological problems. Difficulties in the measurement of emotion, emotion regulation, and their development (e.g., quantitative and qualitative aspects; validity of verbal and behavioral measures; their coherence across situations and development) are multiplied by challenges in cross-cultural studies (e.g., control of biases; functional equivalence of concepts and methods across...
Another reason is the difficulty in questioning and in going beyond familiar theoretical concepts and assumptions.

For a science of emotion, we need to know how the experience, expression, and regulation of emotions are linked to cultural values and socialization conditions in individual development. Different paths for the development of emotions and regulation are to be expected in contexts differing in the cultural model of the self. For example, parenting attributes that lead to optimal emotion development in certain cultures may have dysfunctional effects in others. Also, single variables (such as self-construal) cannot explain cultural differences in emotion development unless these are studied in relation to other psychological factors (e.g., autonomy/relatedness; control orientation; empathy). Therefore, theoretical approaches to the socialization and development of emotions and regulation need to integrate other relevant research, focus on universalities and culture-specific pathways, inter-cultural and intra-cultural differences, and overcome ethnocentric biases. Will developmental psychology meet the challenge to contribute to a science of emotions?

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References


Capturing the Culture in the Cultural Socialization of Emotion

Pamela M. Cole
Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16802, USA
E-mail: pzm5@psu.edu

Patricia Z. Tan
Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16802, USA
E-mail: pzt104@psu.edu

Recently, a National Geographic article described the Csángós, a people living in the Moldavia region of Romania (Viviano, 2005). The author remarked that their household design and social customs were strikingly similar to those of Mongolian Kazakhs. The Csángós believe they are descendants of the Huns, evidenced in their oral history and folk songs. Their language is a mix of Magyar, Romanian, Turkic, Persian, and phrases from lost languages, a fact attributed to their presumed nomadic ancestry. Their religious practices mingle Christianity and witchcraft. Their Romanian settlements have existed under the control of different powers over time, including German Saxony and Hungary.

The depiction of the Csángós portrays the complexity and fluidity of culture when it is viewed in its full dimensions. Their case is intriguing but far from isolated. Consider your own cultural heritage. The first author’s grandparents, born in Newfoundland, seemed Irish. They spoke English with a brogue, prepared meals as the Irish do, and enjoyed Irish folk music. Grandfather’s Irishness was more clear than grandmother’s; her maiden name is found in Sweden, not Ireland, and their children had a distinctly Nordic appearance, tall, fair, and angular. So how should they be classified in a study of the cultural socialization of emotion? Was it Viking stoicism that explained why their anger could only be discerned from a firmly set jaw and stony silence? Or was this more Irish Catholic? When upset by the injustices of childhood, how often children were told to offer their suffering up for the poor souls in purgatory!

Each of our personal stories, and the stories of any peoples, contain multiple influences that affect our emotional lives, including a heritage of shared practices and routines that reflect a group’s adaptation to its physical and social circumstances (LeVine, Dixon, LeVine, Richman, Leiderman, Keefer, & Brazelton, 1994; Super & Harkness, 1986). Despite an emerging literature on the cultural socialization of emotion (Cole & Tan, in press), it is surprising how little the research tells us about the specific cultural factors that influence socialization. We focus here on two reasons that our knowledge is limited. First, there has been a relative dearth of studies that conceptualize cultural influences. Often, groups have been formed on the basis of a single factor, such as race (African-American or Euro-American), primary language spoken (Latino and Anglo), or nationality (Chinese and American), without a conceptual framework for what the groupings indexed. What, for example, is the cultural lens of any one Euro-American research participant? Does an aristocratic Venezuelan parent share values or practices in common with a Chicana migrant parent? The careful selection of groups that differ on focal dimensions, and not on others, is one strategy that will increase our knowledge of the specific ways that culture influences socialization.

Of studies that have adopted a conceptual framework, many have relied on a single broad dimension to capture culture. For example, many studies apply only one of the several dimensions that are proposed to characterize nations and persons, i.e., individualism—collectivism (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1989). A more revealing strategy might be choosing groups that share one dimension (e.g., collectivism) but differ on another dimension (e.g., power distance), particularly if these are believed to have relevance for socialization. Another approach is to capture cultural change, e.g., comparing immigrant groups with those in their homeland and adopted culture. In both of these strategies, it is also important to assess the degree to which individuals in a group identify with the values or practices that they are purported to share. Within group variation can provide a compelling test of cultural influences, especially when assessment of culture examines how individuals understand, interpret and respond to the cultural factors and relates these to socialization practices.

Consider the following. In regard to children’s emotions, the available evidence suggests that Chinese and Japanese adults prefer emotional restraint in children, in contrast to middle class, White, U.S. parents who encourage appropriate emotional expression. But what if we find, as the literature suggests, that Chinese mothers shame their young children when they behave in angry and selfish ways and Japanese mothers indulge and cajole the whining, demanding youngster? These are very different ways of fostering emotional restraint. It is not clear that a concept like collectivism can shed light on such differences. Asian culture is also described as placing greater emphasis on the interdependence than the independence of selves, and this is thought to explain less emotional expressiveness in Asian peoples in comparison with Westerners (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Yet this too seems to fall short of explaining different practices among Asian mothers. The Chinese mother wants her child to be concerned about the needs of others more than of self (a form of interdependence) and may be guided by Confucian principles of child rearing (Fung, 1999). The Japanese mother, on the other hand, is motivated to promote amae, which also has the quality of interdependence (Lebra, 2000). What cultural factors press one group toward coddling and indulging the whining preschooler and another toward a stern shaming? What do these behaviors mean to each mother and how do they perceive each other? Consider that Cameroonian Nso mothers perceive German mothers’ en face reciprocal positive exchanges with their infants, the hallmark of sensitive mothering, as sadly cold and distant, believing that warmth and love are conveyed through close physical contact (Keller, Voelker, & Yovsi, 2005).

We learned about the complexity and fluidity of culture in our first ventures at studying the Tamang people of rural Nepal. We wished to study the socialization of anger in a culture that was noted for striving to be cheerful, gracious and harmonious. We felt it was crucial to compare the
Tamang with another Nepali ethnic group to capture the Tamang quality. The myriad of differences between U.S. and Nepali lives, we believed, would obscure our ability to capture specific cultural influences. We chose Brahman culture for comparison because Nepali people felt there was a very sharp distinction between Brahmans and Tamang. We found Brahman villages that were similar in many ways to the Tamang villages (e.g., poverty, community size, collectivist social orientation, patrifocal conjoint households with hierarchical social structure). Through extended discourse with villagers, we found a shared understanding of what we call anger in English; both groups of people have terms for internal states involving blocked goals or unfair treatment and associate these with particular expressions and behaviors. With these various commonalities, we hoped to sharpen our focus on how being Tamang or Brahman influenced emotion socialization.

We found distinct differences in school age children’s emotional scripts for how they feel and what they reveal of their feelings in difficult interpersonal situations (Cole & Tamang, 1998; Cole, Bruschi, & Tamang, 2002). Tamang children do not endorse anger as a response to challenges that U.S. children do; Brahman children endorse anger but claim they do not reveal their anger as U.S. children do. We interpreted the results as evidence that cultural values are communicated to children early in life in the course of their daily lives. We therefore observed caregiver responses to young children’s emotions and found, amidst many commonalities, differences in caregiver responses to anger (Cole, Tamang, & Shrestha, in press). Tamang youngsters gain very little by being angry, whereas angry Brahman youngsters are more likely to get positive attention. To understand these practices, we then interviewed village elders about the qualities of competent children. We hoped their answers would reveal socialization goals that contextualized the different practices we observed. Tamang elders emphasized social grace whereas Brahman elders emphasized academic competence (Cole, Walker, & Tamang, in press). Tamang elders always mentioned never being angry, even when circumstances might provoke anger, as a hallmark of social competence; there was no evidence of a link between the Brahman emphasis on academic competence and anger.

Yet the more we tried to capture the culture, the more we realized that we had much to account for to achieve any specificity of what cultural factors influenced emotion socialization. From our reading of anthropological studies conducted in the Himalaya, Nepalese history, and religious studies of Buddhism and Hinduism, we knew there were, at least, three intersecting cultural factors that might account for the emotion socialization differences. First, we cling to the belief that there are prototypic “Tamang” or “Brahman” qualities to the lives of the villagers. For example, there is the Tamang cultural priority that seems to organize village life, involving the importance of interpersonal tolerance, good will, and egalitarianism that is instantiated in many ways. This egalitarianism is interesting in light of the fact that Tamang share a hierarchical social structure with Brahmans and other peoples of Nepal.
(e.g., “peers” establish who is the elder in order to use proper kinship terms and appropriate behavior; Cole, Walker, & Tamang-Lama, in press). Thus, we need to study the intersection of egalitarian and hierarchical principles and how these values influence emotion socialization practices.

Second, spiritual beliefs influence culture in these villages and conceptions of right conduct. The Tamang, for example, follow a form of Tibetan Buddhism. Buddhist scripture indicates that anger is the most destructive of the human emotions. It interferes with compassion toward others and inner peace, conduct that constitutes the Buddhist path of escape from the cycle of reincarnation. This differs from the Hindu path of escape that emphasizes asceticism and spiritual purity. But what is being Buddhist or Hindu to these villagers? Does the degree to which one understands or adheres to religious principles influence emotion socialization? Finally, culture and religion are implicated in a third factor that distinguishes Tamang and Brahman. In the mid-1800’s, Nepal legally codified the Hindu caste system. Caste violations became unlawful and to determine such violations all persons had to be ranked by caste, even non-Hindus such as the Tamang. The Tamang engage in practices (drinking alcohol, eating meat) that are polluting (contaminate spiritual purity) and thus Tamang were designated a lower “caste.” Although the law no longer exists, the oppression it wrought made the Tamang a political minority group, whereas the rural Brahman farmer retains pride in the Brahman high caste status. These sociopolitical influences infiltrate inter group relations and self identity today. To what degree does minority and majority status penetrate Tamang and Brahman socialization of anger and other emotions?

We have provided many illustrations of the complexity and fluidity of culture. It seems crucial that our developmental science make greater strides at capturing those qualities if we are to understand how, when, and why a basic, universal process (the capacity to be emotional) comes to be shaped by culturally specific influences. First, to the degree that we can situate participants in their historical, geographical, political, religious, economic, and physical settings and routines, the better our chances of understanding why culture influences psychological development. Second, culture is best captured at the level of practices and routines but, if a cultural value or belief is thought to be the basis for a practice or routine, it too should be measured. However, research makes clear that values diverge from socialization practices (Cole & Tan, in press) and thus we agree with the importance of studying actual practices as the active creation of culture (Rogoff, 2003; Weisner, 2002). Third, many scholars have noted that there can be more variation within than between groups. Therefore, it is important to assess the degree to which individual participants share a particular practice, value or identity. Fourth, our developmental models need to conceptualize how cultural priorities translate into socialization goals and practices, how they are transmitted across generations, and why they change. Research conducted without a rich conceptualization and careful assessment of culture leaves us wondering (a) which specific “cultural” factors account for group differences, (b) when and why such differences emerge in the course of a child’s, a family’s or a community’s development, and (c) how each cultural factor comes to influence psychological processes.

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Developing Emotion Knowledge in Cultural Contexts

Qi Wang
Department of Human Development, Cornell University
Ithaca, New York, USA
E-mail: qw23@cornell.edu

Emotion knowledge (EK), or emotion situation knowledge, is the schematic knowledge of situational antecedents of emotions. It directs situation appraisal or meaning analysis and thus plays a critical role in causing and constituting actual emotional experience and behavior (e.g., Frijda, 1986). EK can further promote conflict resolution and other positive social behavior in children. Preschoolers’ EK contributes to both their concurrent and long-term social competence (Denham, Blair, DeMulder, Levitas, Sawyer, Auerbach-Major, & Queenan, 2003). While the development of EK can be attributed to many cognitive, linguistic, and social mechanisms, recent cross-cultural studies have revealed the central role of culture in affecting how children come to understand emotions.

Cultural Socialization of EK

The immediacy of culture is manifested in the daily settings of children’s lives, where family socialization goals and practices directly reflect different cultural views of emotion. For instance, in Euro-American culture that emphasizes individuality and autonomy, emotion is often regarded as a direct expression of the self and an affirmation of the uniqueness of the individual. Middle-class Euro-American parents are often eager to “help children to convey or articulate their own emotions and feelings so that ultimately they can ‘get their needs met’” (Chao, 1995, p. 339). Family experts also advocate that parents play the role of “emotion coaches” and discuss emotions and acknowledge the child’s emotional experiences in order to raise an “emotionally intelligent” child (Gottman, 1998). Spontaneous family discussions about feeling states often invite the participation of even young toddlers to foster their emotion understanding (e.g., Breherton, Fritz, Zahn-Waxler & Ridgeway, 1986). Early family emotion discourse and parental positive responsiveness to child emotions are found to directly contribute to children’s developing EK (Denham & Kochanoff, 2002; Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991).

In contrast, in many East Asian cultures such as Korea, China, and Japan that put a premium on social harmony and group interests, emotion, especially negative emotion, is often viewed as destructive or even dangerous to ongoing relationships and therefore needs to be strictly controlled. Even positive emotion like love, when openly expressed, is thought to be a potential enemy of the social order by interfering with appropriate behavior, such as respect and obedience in the case of a son to a father, that is necessary to optimally maintain a relationship (Potter, 1988). Asian parents are not preoccupied with helping children express or understand emotions but rather emphasize psychological discipline and behavioral standards (Chen, Hastings, Rubin, Chen, Cen, & Stewart, 1998; Mullen & Yi, 1995; Wang, 2001; Zahn-Waxler, Friedman, Cole, Mizuta, & Hiruma, 1996). And in keeping with the Confucian teachings of moderation, parents often expect their children to restrain their emotions from an early age, a characteristic viewed as good manners and important in promoting social harmony.

Parent–child Past Emotion Talk

Family discussion of past emotions may be a particularly important forum for emotion socialization. In discussing past emotions, parents and children are not in the heat of the moment and may be better able to reflect on the causes and consequences of children’s emotional experience. Furthermore, by focusing the discussion on certain emotions, parents may convey to children what kinds of emotions are important to the self and the social group and what emotional reactions are culturally appropriate within particular situations. We have conducted a series of studies to examine mother-child conversations of shared emotional experiences in Euro-American and Chinese middle-class families (Fivush & Wang, 2005; Wang & Fivush, 2005; Wang, 2001). We used semi-structured interviews where mothers selected past emotional events and then discussed the events with their children alone in a quiet place in the home, with their conversation being tape-recorded. For instance, in a recent study (Wang & Fivush, 2005), mothers discussed with their 3-year-olds two emotionally salient events in which they both participated. One event was extremely positive to the child, one extremely stressful.

While examining the events mothers selected for discussion, we categorized the focal incident that caused the child’s emotion within each event into one of two mutually exclusive types: Social theme focused on interpersonal situations as the antecedent of children’s emotions (e.g., being visited by a friend or being scolded by an adult). Personal theme focused on situations where children’s emotions were caused by objects or events in the environment (e.g., receiving a present or having a shot). A majority of both Euro-American (71%) and Chinese mothers (76%) focused on a social theme in the positive event. However, in the negative event, a majority of Chinese mothers (86%) focused on a social theme and a majority of Euro-American mothers (75%) focused on a personal theme that elicited negative emotions in children.

Systematic cultural differences further emerged in the ways that mothers integrated emotions into their
conversations. For both positive and negative events, Euro-American mothers initiated more interactive and elaborative conversations, provided support to facilitate the child’s participation, and focused on the child’s own roles and predilections. In contrast, Chinese mothers often took a directive role in posing and repeating memory questions and frequently referred to social interaction and significant others. Furthermore, Euro-American mothers often employed a “cognitive approach” to the regulation of negative emotion, where they talked frequently about the causes of the child’s feeling states and provided elaborate explanations as to why and how the child experienced the emotion. They were also ready to accept the child’s negative emotions and reassure the child that everything was all right. In contrast, Chinese mothers often took a “behavioral approach” to emotion regulation, where they initiated little causal discussion to help children understand their feeling states and often commented on the child’s emotions in a way to “teach the child a lesson” about his or her negative emotional experience and rule-violating behavior. And consistent with the belief about emotion being potentially threatening to interpersonal harmony, Chinese mothers often prescribed the child’s negative emotions as unacceptable (e.g., “You shouldn’t get mad at Papa.”) and as needing to be controlled or resolved through the child’s proper behavior in the future. The two conversational excerpts in Table 1 illustrate these structural and content variations in mother-child past emotion talk.

In a subsequent study (Fivush & Wang, 2005), we analyzed dyadic emotional exchanges between Euro-American and Chinese mothers and their 3-year-olds during conversations of highly positive and highly negative experiences. We found that mothers and children in the two cultures were equally likely to attribute an emotional state to self or other, to confirm a shared emotional perspective, and to elaborate on an emotion that they agreed upon. However, compared with the Chinese dyads, the Euro-American dyads more frequently engaged in extended conversations about an emotion in which they disagreed about the emotional reaction. Such negotiations included extended denials (e.g., M: “Were you scared?” C: “No.” M: “No? You seemed really scared. You came into Mommy and Daddy’s room.” C: “I wasn’t scared.”) and disagreements about the actual emotion experienced (e.g. M: “You were angry when Jenny wouldn’t play with you.” C: “No, sad.” M: “Sad? I thought you were angry. Were you sad?” C: “Yes.” M: “Ok, you I guess you were sad and angry.”). It appears that Euro-American mothers assume that children have independent emotional experiences and have privileged knowledge of those experiences; and even at this early point in development, Euro-American children are given opportunities to disagree and argue with their mothers about their own emotions.

Table 1. Conversational Excerpts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Euro-American mother-child dyad</th>
<th>Chinese mother-child dyad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M: ... Do you remember doing some crying?</td>
<td>M: ... Do you remember why Dad spanked you last time?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Why did I cry?</td>
<td>C: Chess!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M: I’m not quite sure why you cried. But do you remember where you were?</td>
<td>M: Why chess? What did you do with chess?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: I cried because I had any, no any balloon.</td>
<td>C: Not obedient!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M: They had no balloon. But then, you were also crying because, did you not want to go home?</td>
<td>M: How were you not being obedient?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Yeah.</td>
<td>C: (I) threw the pieces on the floor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M: Where were you?</td>
<td>M: All over the floor, right? And did you do it on purpose?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: At Stewart Park!</td>
<td>C: Umm. I’ll be careful next time!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M: (Laughs). You did cry a lot at Stewart Park, but, um, this was in Joe’s parking lot. Do you remember Joe’s Restaurant parking lot? Do you remember standing by the door and crying?</td>
<td>M: Right! That’s why Dad spanked your bottom, right? ... Did you cry then?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Yeah.</td>
<td>C: (I) cried.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M: You do?</td>
<td>M: Did it hurt?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Yeah.</td>
<td>C: It hurt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M: What were you crying about?</td>
<td>M: It hurt? It doesn’t hurt anymore, right?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: ‘Cause I didn’t wanted to leave yet; it was because I wanted to eat.</td>
<td>C: Right. I’ll be careful next time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M: Oh you wanted to eat some more (laughs); is that why?</td>
<td>C: Umm, be careful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Yeah.</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M: Hmm. I remember Mommy tried to pick you up and you put up a little bit of a fight. You were crying real hard. Maybe it was ‘cause the balloon and maybe it was ‘cause you were hungry. But we knew that you could get another balloon, right?</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Children’s Developing EK

Divergent family socialization goals and practices, evident early in children’s lives, may affect developmental outcomes in children’s EK. In a cross-sectional study, I tested EK in 154 Euro-American and Chinese 3- to 6-year-olds (Wang, 2003). During individual interviews, children were presented with 20 short stories and asked to identify the feeling states of a protagonist of their age, gender, and ethnicity. They responded by choosing among faces showing happy, sad, fearful, or angry emotions. Children’s mothers and a second group of adults answered the same questions by filling out a questionnaire. Based on the concordant judgments between children and adults in each culture, Euro-American children showed greater knowledge of emotion situations and made more rapid progress in such knowledge than their Chinese peers. This pattern of cultural differences was particularly prominent for negative emotions. Interestingly, when asked how strongly the protagonist felt the emotions, both children and adults in the Chinese sample gave lower intensity ratings for all negative emotions than did their Euro-American counterparts, consistent with the Confucian teachings of moderation in all matters of heart.

In an ongoing longitudinal study, we found cultural differences in EK among children as young as age 3. The participants were 189 preschoolers and their mothers from Chinese families in China, first-generation immigrant Chinese families in the U.S., and Euro-American families. Maternal interaction styles and children’s EK were assessed 3 times at home, when the child was 3, 3.5, and 4.5 years of age. We used two tasks to assess children’s EK. The first is an emotion production task adapted from Harris, Olthof, Terwogt, and Hardman (1987), where children were asked to describe situations likely to provoke happy, sad, fearful, or angry emotions. The second task was an emotion judgment task adapted from Wang (2003), where children were asked to select one out of four emotion faces (happy, sad, fearful, angry) that best showed how a protagonist felt in 12 story situations. At age 3, Euro-American youngsters already scored higher on EK than their Chinese and immigrant Chinese peers, especially in the emotion production task for both positive and negative emotions (Wang, Hutt, Kulkofsky, McDermott, & Wei, 2005). This pattern of cultural differences remained constant across preschool years. Figure 1 illustrates children’s EK scores at the 3-time points. We are currently analyzing data to examine the concurrent and long-term effects of maternal conversational styles about emotion on children’s developing EK.

EK and Autobiographical Memory

EK has been shown to serve important psychosocial functions (e.g., Denham, Blair, DeMulder, Levitas, Sawyer, Auerbach-Major & Queenan, 2003). Yet little is known about its cognitive consequences. Our research has set out to examine the influence of EK on autobiographical memory (AM). AM encompasses memory for significant personal experiences and knowledge of the self and is, therefore, crucial for personal identity and psychological well-being. EK may affect AM through multiple processes. It first enables the individual to interpret and understand the emotional meaning of the event situation and thus to perceive its personal relevance or importance, making the event more memorable. It further manifests in the anticipation and actual experience of emotions within the situation, which, in turn, facilitates the encoding of the event information in memory (Christianson, 1992). In addition, EK may provide an organizational structure to process, represent, and organize AMs, allowing them to be effectively stored and retrieved. During ontogenetic development, the acquisition of EK allows children to understand the personal meaning of events, to experience culturally appropriate emotions during the events, and to organize the event information in a structured fashion, thereby facilitating retention of and access to the memories over the long term.

Would the early acquisition of EK in Euro-American children help them better remember their personal experiences than their Asian peers? Our research has shown that, when interviewed about memories of significant personal events, such as one thing the child did recently that was really special and fun, or a recent time when the child was scolded by a parent, Euro-American preschoolers often provide memory accounts that are more elaborate, more specific, more focused on the self, and richer in emotion than those of Korean and Chinese children (Han, Leichtman, & Wang, 1998; Wang, 2004). Such cultural differences in AM further extend into adulthood (Wang, in press; Wang & Conway, 2004).

More important, the effect of EK on AM is also evident at the individual level. In a recent study (Wang et al., 2005), we found that, among Euro-American, Chinese, and immigrant Chinese 3-year-olds, those who had greater EK also remembered more details of autobiographical events, and this was true regardless of culture or gender groups and independent of child age and language skills. EK was further found to be an important mediator of cultural effects on children’s memory recall. These findings provide the first evidence for the direct influence of EK on AM.

Conclusion and Future Directions

Children come to form their theories of emotions through participating in everyday social practices embedded in the larger context of culture. Our studies have shown that different ways of discussing past emotions in the family reflect parents’ implicit or explicit goals of emotion socialization in consonance with different cultural views of emotion. For Euro-American mothers, emotions constitute an important aspect of the child’s self and therefore need to be fully explained and elaborated on in order to facilitate the child’s individuality and emotion understanding. For Chinese mothers, emotions are consequences of the child’s social acts and therefore are instrumental for helping the child control negative feelings and impulses and for further reinforcing in the child proper behavioral conduct and a sense of connectedness. These different family narrative practices influence children’s developing EK, which, in turn, bears developmental consequences for children’s cognition such as autobiographical memory.

It is important to continue the investigation of EK in children of diverse cultural, ethnic, and SES backgrounds, and to examine the influence of cultural transformation (e.g., immigration, modernization) on the practices and outcomes of emotion socialization. Cross-cultural research...
on children’s understanding of other types of emotions, particularly self-conscious emotions such as shame, guilt, and pride, is called for. It is also of great interest to compare in a cross-cultural context children’s EK of situations that require perspective role-taking (e.g., how a grandma feels when seeing her grandchild) and of those that perhaps mainly involve self-projection (e.g., how a child feels when seeing her grandma). Such studies will help to further reveal the development of EK as a cultural constructive process that gives rise to diversity as well as commonality in human emotion.

References


Cross-cultural differences in emotional expressivity have captured the attention of anthropologist, psychologists, and laypeople alike. However, the developmental origins of such differences are poorly understood. Many anthropologists (e.g., Birdwhistle, 1970) have emphasized the role of culture, implying that socialization processes completely determine the group differences that are observed. In contrast, some psychologists (e.g., Freedman, 1974; Kagan & Fox, in press; Kagan, Kearsley, & Zelazo, 1978) have proposed that ethnic differences may exist in infants’ innate emotional reactivity, providing the basis for differences observed in expressive behavior at older ages. Some of the best-documented cultural differences in emotional expressivity come from studies involving comparisons between Chinese and European American infants and children. In this essay, we will briefly review these studies, discuss alternative interpretations for the obtained results and indicate directions for future research that might lead us to a better understanding of emotional expression across cultures.

Over 35 years ago, Freedman (1974; Freedman & Freedman, 1969) reported that European American neonates showed more reactivity and distress during infant testing procedures than Japanese infants who, in turn, showed more reactivity and distress than Chinese-American infants. Freedman attributed these findings to innate differences among the ethnic groups. While additional cross-cultural studies of Asian and European American neonates are virtually nonexistent, some research has been conducted with older Chinese, Japanese, and European American infants (e.g., Caudill & Weinstein, 1969; Fogel, Toda, & Kawai, 1988; Kagan, Arcus, Snidman, Feng, Hendler & Greene, 1994; Kisilevsky et al., 1998; Kuchner, 1989; see Camras, Oster, Campos, Ujiie, Miyake, Wang & Meng, 1997 for more detailed review). Although results have not been entirely consistent, a number of investigations (e.g., Camras, Chen, Bakeman, Norris, & Cain, in press; Kagan, et al., 1978, 1994; Lewis, Ramsay, & Kawakami, 1993) have found Asian infants to be less facially expressive than European American infants in several situations. Results have been particularly robust in studies comparing European American and Chinese or Chinese-American infants. For example, in a collaborative cross-cultural study of 11-month-old Chinese, Japanese and European American infants (Camras, Oster, Campos, Campos, Ujiie, Miyake, Lie & Meng, 1998), my collaborators and I studied babies participating in procedures designed to elicit the emotions of mild anger/frustration
European American mother and her adopted Chinese daughter mainland Chinese girls. Self-reported maternal strictness, girls produced more disgust-related expressions than expressions and overall expressivity. Adopted Chinese higher than mainland Chinese girls for disgust-related mainland Chinese and Chinese American girls and scored showed that European American girls smiled more than that might affect the children’s expressivity. Results our findings were consistent with the results reported by Freedman (1974) for neonates and Kagan et al. (1994) for 4-month-old infants. That is, Chinese girls were generally less expressive than the European American infants on measures of both positive and negative emotion.

Are these consistently-observed differences between Chinese and European American infants due to inherent differences in emotional responsivity (as proposed by Kagan and Freedman) or cultural differences in infants’ experiences including differences that might affect the infants’ emotion socialization? My colleagues and I have attempted to further investigate this issue by capitalizing on a natural experiment currently taking place within the international adoption community. In our study (Camras et al., in press), we compared the expressive behavior of 3-year-old Chinese girls adopted into European American families to non-adopted European American, non-adopted Chinese American, and non-adopted mainland Chinese girls. The children viewed and responded to slides with emotion-evoking content (e.g., a kitten with sunglasses, a girl pretending to eat a worm). In addition, we collected self-report data on mother’s childrearing attitudes, identification with Chinese culture, and self-expressiveness within the family as well as other ecological variables that might affect the children’s expressivity. Results showed that European American girls smiled more than mainland Chinese and Chinese American girls and scored higher than mainland Chinese girls for disgust-related expressions and overall expressivity. Adopted Chinese girls produced more disgust-related expressions than mainland Chinese girls. Self-reported maternal strictness, aggravated, positive expressiveness, and cultural identification correlated with children’s facial responses as did number of siblings and adults in the home. Regression analyses failed to find significant differences among groups of children beyond those that could be accounted for by differences in their mothers’ attitudes toward childrearing, including their attitudes regarding children’s expression and control of emotion. Thus results suggest that cultural and family environment influences facial expressivity, creating differences among children of the same ethnicity.

While these studies have contributed to our greater understanding of emotional expressivity across cultures, still they have several limitations that should be addressed in future research. These limitations are related to the fact that the research reflects a Western perspective on both emotional expression and childhood socialization. In the past several years, there has been a greater awareness of indigenous perspectives within psychology. A truly indigenous theory is born out of the culture that it is crafted to represent. As researchers we need to ask the question: how much weight do different indigenous perspectives deserve when looking at a phenomenon such as emotional expressivity? In general terms, the questions surrounding and implications of using a strictly indigenous perspective and a more indigenized version of Western psychology are presented in the 2000 edition of the ISSBD Newsletter dedicated to the topic (Miller & Chen, 2000).

Below we will consider three limitations of our research related to the issue of indigenous perspectives. First, in working to develop a more culturally sensitive and relevant research design it is important to consider the possibility that the expression measurement systems we have thus far employed may fail to capture the means through which emotion is expressed by Chinese infants and children. That is, there may be cues in the infants’ faces or in their non-facial behavior that communicate their feelings more clearly and strongly than those included in our coding system. A possible alternative would be to have Chinese mothers view videotaped emotion eliciting situations and ask them to identify both the elicited emotions and also the cues that they are using to identify those emotions. This would be considered indigenization of Western psychological theory as it incorporates the Chinese perspective on emotional expression and would allow comparisons between the two cultures.

A second limitation involves the measurement of potential environmental influences on emotional expressivity. For example, many scholars have proposed that maternal attitudes and behaviors influence infants’ and children’s emotional behavior. Indeed, in our study we found evidence for this in that some of the mothers’ self-rated childrearing attitudes were related to their children’s emotional expressivity. Yet because we employed instruments developed for research with American children (e.g., the Self-Expressiveness in the Family Questionnaire), it remains possible that our self-report measures did not accurately portray the attitudes and behaviors of Chinese mothers that impact their children’s emotional behavior. For example, we obtained relatively low internal reliability statistics for the Warmth subscale of our parent attitude measure. This suggests that the behaviors that Westerners typify as characteristic of maternal warmth may not
translate or may not sufficiently capture the range of behaviors that are indicative of maternal warmth in China. Furthermore, we had no measure of attitudes and behaviors related to the Chinese concept of filial piety (Ho, 1996) and these may have an important impact on Chinese children’s emotional expressivity. Lastly, the self-report measures in our study utilized Likert rating scales. Using such scales with participants from different cultures introduces several potential problems ranging from differential experience with the presentation format to differential response styles. For example, participants from some cultures may be less willing to choose extreme scale values than participants from other cultures. There are also a number of well documented issues surrounding item formulation, instrument translation, equivalence and bias in the test and measurement literature that cross-cultural researchers should be aware of (for a more complete review see Brislin, 1986; Fischer, 2004; Geisinger, 2003; van de Vijver and Leung, 1997).

A third limitation involves the restricted range of contexts in which infant emotional expressions have been studied. In particular, most studies have been restricted to laboratory contexts in which both infants and mother may feel awkward and uncomfortable. For example, in our research, some experiments were conducted outside the participant’s home environment in the presence of an experimenter who was a “stranger” to both the mother and the child. In such studies, Chinese infants may feel more uncomfortable than Western infants and therefore display more muted responses. Future studies might consider determining if the significant finding of lesser expressivity typically found for Chinese infants extends to more naturalistic contexts involving interactions with familiar people (e.g. mom, primary caregiver, etc).

While the current body of literature on emotional expressivity is interesting and sheds some light on the development of cross-cultural differences, it is far from complete. As we have suggested through the course of this paper, there are numerous considerations that researchers in the area should incorporate into their future research designs. In today’s global community there is a need for a more complete understanding of emotional expressivity in different cultures—especially when those cultures are now only a mouse click away. Such understanding will have important implications for contemporary theories of emotion and also for communication by professionals and laypeople alike who may have internet friends or colleagues in China and other non-Western cultures.

References


The topic of the relation between culture and emotion is a complex one and the four papers give us an interesting and diverse view of the subject. Perhaps I can best discuss these papers by asking and suggesting some answers to a set of questions. To begin, with regard to emotion, what is universal and what is relative or cultural? That is, are we willing to consider that in emotional life, there are universal features and there are relative ones? This gives rise to a second concern, namely, what do we mean by the term “emotion”? Having addressed these questions, we need next to consider what do we mean when we talk about cultural differences. What is culture and how do we describe cultural features? The connection between these cultural features and emotional life requires that both of these terms be carefully defined. Unfortunately, this is not yet the case.

If we wish to study emotional development within a framework of Universals and/or cultural influences, it is necessary to ask what do we mean by the term “emotion.” In the papers under review, this need becomes clear as Professor Wang’s discussion centers on emotional knowledge, which has a cognitive focus, whereas the others speak to other aspects like emotional expression and state. Lewis (1992), Lewis and Michalson, (1983), and Frijda (1986), along with others, have articulated a theory of emotion, which distinguishes between three different features of emotion. As we shall see, any discussion of universals and/or cultural effects on emotion needs to be considered within the context of these features.

The first of the three features is emotional expressions, which have been defined as the external manifestations of internal states, including face, voice, and bodily actions. Following Darwin’s initial observation, others have argued that these expressions are universal and in some one-to-one fashion constitute these internal states. Moreover, they may be connected to specific environmental situations that have an adaptive evolutionary history. However universal emotional expressions may be, it is certainly the case that there are specific cultural rules and there is learning which either produces an association between an environmental event and expression or disassociates their connection. We know that children learn to mask their emotional responses so that whatever universals may exist, familial and cultural differences affect whether they will be expressed and how.

Emotional states are inferred bodily manifestations of what we describe as specific emotions. The location and nature of these internal bodily states has been a matter of concern dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century as investigators have tried to measure psychological behaviors associated with such things as heart rate and GSR changes. More contemporary research has focused on brain activity. Some have held to the belief that there is no such thing as an emotional state, believing instead that there are no unique internal bodily states but only cognitions about situations and behavior (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). These two views concerning emotional states are tied to the universal versus relative consideration. In the Universal View, emotional states are assumed to be the same over time and place. The feelings of shame, for example, are the same whether you are a 10-year-old or 40-year-old American or whether you are a 40-year-old Japanese adult. What precipitates the shame and how the shame is experienced may differ, but the shame feeling, if we could measure it, is always the same.

In the Relative View, emotional states are assumed to vary from culture to culture. It is believed that feeling states are related to what causes them. Shame over an action that disrupts your social group, shame over aggressive impulses, and shame over your individual failure at a task are different feelings. These two world views are at the heart of the cultural versus biological argument. Those arguing for the existence of such internal states have used universal facial expression to argue for their existence. Another way to consider the Universal View is to show that there is a strong connection between specific environmental events and emotional behavior in the very young infant. Such a direct connection would support an internal state-like structure. There is some support for such a connection, but it is quite weak. What may be needed is a more robust consideration of the meaning of “environment events.” For example, it may be a universal case that the blockage of a goal leads to anger, loss leads to sadness, and uncertainty leads to fear. Exactly what specific events are related to blockage of a goal, loss, or uncertainty may be culturally defined. Alternatively, there may be universal events; attachment theorists would argue that the loss of the mother is one such universal event.

Emotional experience is the third feature of emotion. Experience is reflected, for example, in the statement, “I am happy.” The state of happiness is reflective with the self as the object of the state. Emotional experiences can be explicit or may be implicit. For James (1890), emotions were defined as the “experience” of bodily sensation. Darwin, and, more recently, Lewis, have drawn a distinction between the class of emotions which require experience and those that do not, and have labeled the former “self-conscious emotions.” From a developmental perspective, the earlier emotions, which are not self-reflective, have been called primary or basic emotions and are seen even in the first months of life. Lewis and colleagues have been able to show that self-representation as measured by self-recognition, personal pronoun usage, and pretend play are the prerequisites of the next set of emotions, the self-conscious ones.

While the early emotions may be tied to specific environmental events, the self-conscious emotions are not. The events which elicit shame or pride, for example, are determined by the culture and family which are then incorporated into the child’s mental scheme. It is the child’s attributions of success or failure as well as their attributions of responsibility which are the elicitors of these self-conscious emotions. As such, they perhaps much more than the early emotions, are subjected to familial and cultural rules, standards, and goals.

The emergence of the self-conscious emotions rests on the emergent self of a representation. There is now evidence to
suggest that the emergence of the self is universal and related to brain maturation; however, the features of that self are culturally derived. Much as Piaget argued that object permanence was the first feature of objects to emerge, before other features such as size, color, or shape, we have suggested that self—the mental representation of the idea of me—also emerges first, followed by the other characteristics of self, which are culturally relevant. One such set of characteristics is the we-self and the I-self distinction often described (see Trommsdorff this issue).

Let us look at the general principles underlying the production of shame as an example of cultural relativism as well as Universals regarding both self and self-conscious emotions. First, there must be a self—defined as an I-self or we-self. Second, there must be a set of standards, rules, and goals. Both the United States and Japan have recognized social rules. Third, the self must break a rule. Can a we-self break a rule just like an I-self? The answer is yes since there may be different rules for different cultures. Even so, the rule breaker has a specific location, that of the I-self. A good example of this is found in Shweder’s account of menstruation rules among the Oriya Indians, a we-self culture (1985). When the woman has her period, she becomes polluted. She cannot eat with her family or sleep in her husband’s bed. She cannot be touched when she is approached by her young child. She must say, “Mara heici, Chhu! Chhu na!” “I am polluted. Don’t touch me! Don’t touch me!” Such rituals inform us about two aspects of the self. Although much of the self is defined by a we-self rather than an I-self, an I-self, bounded and unique, exists. It is “I” who am polluted and can pollute you. It is this “I” which developmentally emerges and which has the characteristic of existence prior to its cultural features of I-self or we-self.

The second problem we have alluded to has to do with the meaning of culture. While we recognize cultural differences, the meaning of these differences and their measurement is not readily apparent. When I sit in a café in Japan I eat different foods than when I sit in a café in France. The food’s taste, smell, and texture are different. Certainly foods differ by culture, so does language. In many cultures we look differently and dress differently. I could go on with the difference claim, especially that there are self-differences by culture; the we-self versus the I-self difference between East and West. While such differences appear to exist, they may be less cultural and more historic than we usually consider. As a young boy growing up in New York City in the 1940’s, I remember being ashamed not only because I might fail an exam, but also because I knew that my family, who was sacrificing much, would be ashamed of my grades. This seems like a very we-self idea in the United States. Moreover, the Japan I visited in the 1970’s is certainly not the Japan of 2006.

Unless we can specify what cultural differences are more precisely, it is not an easy task to see how we can explore cultural effects on emotional life. John Whiting, many years ago, suggested that looking at cultural differences could expand our knowledge of how socialization differences affected development. For example, he argued that if we were interested in how length of nursing affected the child’s development, one way to explore this was to examine many different cultures and examine how their lengths of nursing, some more and some less than ours, affected the child’s behavior. The independent variable was length of time nursing and the dependent variable was “oral behavior.” But how much different is this than the study of individual differences within a culture? Lewis and Ban (1977) studied five cultures to examine how mothers interacted with their children and more recently Bornstein and his collaborators have done this across many more cultures. There are individual cultural differences in the mother-infant interactions, yet there are many universals because human infants all require and receive holding, touching, smiling, feeding, etc. behaviors.

Unless we can specify what makes cultures different, looking at how culture impacts on children’s emotional life is not possible. We need to know and specify a set of cultural outcomes vis-à-vis emotions in order to examine how culture acts to produce them. For the most part, these cultural outcomes are lacking. Even more daunting is the fact that cultural outcomes are not consistent but change over time. When I visited Japan in 1972, there was no public display of affection, no hand holding, no kissing in public. The Japan of 2006 is not the same. In Professor Trommsdorff’s paper, the point is made that the “I” versus “we” type of self affects how different situations elicit differences in pride, both in Japan and the United States. However, if one looks at sports events in both cultures, one can see individuals in both Japan and the United States responding with pride behaviors when they score a point. Perhaps under public competition, pride behavior is now elicited in similar situations across cultures. Certainly, pride expressions appear universal. We need to remember that even in the United States, there are two types of pride, one called pride and the other hubris (Lewis, 1992). The problem of specifying a set of cultural factors that influence socialization is a point that Professors Cole and Tan also make when they say “it is surprising how little the research tells us about the specific cultural factors.”

The task these four papers have undertaken is formidable given the inherent difficulty in defining cultural differences and in finding socialization styles which foster these differences. Thus, while Professors Camras and Fatoni can point to facial differences between Asian and Western infants, and while they can show that adoption can affect some of these differences, their inability to find socialization practices which underlie them accents the major problem we have. Simply stated, we do not have a good theoretical basis to connect cultural values, goals, or standards to specific socialization practices. Because of this, we do not know where to look nor do we have a good sense of when these socialization practices are likely to have these effects. When we add to this dilemma the problem of understanding what features of emotion we should focus on, we realize the enormity of the undertaking.

References


COMMENTARY: Cultural Influences on Emotional Development: So Much to Do, So Little Time

Nancy Eisenberg
Department of Psychology, Arizona State University
Tempe, Arizona, USA
E-mail: nancyeisenberg@asu.edu

These excellent articles summarize some of the most interesting findings on the socialization of emotion-related skills, raise important questions, and offer useful insights on methods and future directions for research. I will discuss only a few of the many fascinating topics explored in the articles.

The authors discussed some aspects of emotional development that appear to be affected by culture, including emotional expressivity and knowledge of emotional cues and the contextual correlates of emotions. However, as would be expected, there are many more aspects of emotional functioning that might be affected by culture which have been virtually unexamined. For example, if we restrict ourselves to the topic of emotion knowledge (more broadly defined than by Wang), the following is a partial list of skills that could vary across cultures and subcultures (see Saarni, Campos, Camras, & Witherington, in press, for discussion of some of these competencies):

1. the ability to identify others’ emotions through facial expressions, gestures, vocal tone, etc. (e.g., as discussed by Wang);
2. the ability to identify one’s own emotional states;
3. knowledge of what situations are associated with which emotions (e.g., Wang);
4. understanding how to resolve discrepancies between cues related to the expression of emotion and situational cues (e.g., when a child looks sad at his/her birthday party);
5. understanding of personality, experiential, and other factors that cause individual differences in emotion reactions to the same context;
6. knowledge about suppression, neutralization, and faking of emotional expressions;
7. knowledge of when the expression of various emotions is acceptable in a given culture and cultural beliefs regarding the uses of emotions (including when one might want to experience versus not experience given emotions) and the more important emotions to experience (and in what context, e.g., shame and pride; see Cole and Tan; Trommsdorff);
8. knowledge of whether it is considered useful and/or acceptable to try to understand others’ emotions (see Lillard, 1998);
9. knowledge of ways to regulate emotion (see Trommsdorff);
10. knowledge of which modes of emotion regulation are most useful in which context, including whether the experience of emotion and/or the emotion itself should be modulated.

This list could be expanded to cover more nuances in emotional knowledge, some of which may be more important in some cultures than others. And each of these facets of emotion understanding could differ across some cultures, but not others. My point is that we have only begun to scratch the surface in research on the potential role of culture in emotion understanding.

Obviously there also are many emotion-related behavioral skills such as emotional expressivity that also may differ across cultures. For example, as discussed by Trommsdorff, the forms of emotion regulation (e.g., secondary control) that are highly valued may vary across cultures. Children must not only acquire this knowledge, but also develop the skills needed to act in accordance with this knowledge. Accordingly, across cultures, different emotion-related skills may be associated with others’ perceptions of children’s socio-emotional competence. Those emotion-related capacities most valued in a context are likely to be the best predictors of social acceptance, social skills, and psychological adjustment in a given culture, although perhaps not some other aspects of human accomplishment.

In addition to studying mean differences in emotion-related competences in various cultures, information regarding the variability in means across members of a culture may provide insight regarding the degree to which a given emotion-related competency is engrained in the culture (see Cole & Tan). Moreover, because there are probably large individual differences in most emotion-related skills and behavior within cultures, it is important to identify factors such as temperament/personality and socialization experiences that moderate the development of children’s emotion-related competencies within different cultural contexts. Such moderators probably differ somewhat across cultures and may provide insight into the factors that underlie observed main effects differences across groups.

Trommsdorff, Cole and Tan, and Camras all provided numerous compelling examples of how cultures differ in regard to the expression of emotion and how this difference may be due to socialization. Another example is one from our research in Indonesia (Eisenberg, Liew, & Pidada, 2001). In a study of third-grade Javanese school children and their parents (mostly mothers), we found (as in the United States) that parents’ reports of expressing negative emotions in the family were negatively related to children’s positive socioemotional development. However, there was no relation between parents’ reports of expressing positive emotion in the family and children’s adjustment, social competence, or sympathy, although in North American, positive expressivity generally has been positively related to these aspects of development (e.g., Eisenberg, Gershoff, et al., 2001). According to reports of social scientists, the expression of intense emotions, positive or negative, is discouraged in Java and some other parts of Indonesia because it is believed to disrupt human relationships and cause health problems. Emotion regulation is highly valued and parents emphasize the modulation of emotion in the interest of maintaining harmony in relationships. Thus, it is likely that mothers who were relatively intense in their expression of positive emotion were not modeling socially valued emotional expressivity, may have been somewhat lower themselves in sociomotional competence than were less expressive mothers, and did not promote optimal emotional expressivity in their children.

Despite some differences in the socialization correlates of Indonesian and U.S. children’s emotion-related competences, as in the U.S., third grade Indonesian children with greater control
of their attention and the ability to voluntarily inhibit their behavior were better liked, viewed as more socially competent by adults, better adjusted, and more sympathetic (see Eisenberg, Pidada, & Liew, 2004). These relations were not as strong for Indonesian girls by sixth grade, perhaps because most were relatively high in regulation and may have been viewed as relatively competent (Eisenberg, Liew, & Pidada, 2004). Nonetheless, our data (as well as data in China; Zhou, Eisenberg, Wang, & Reiser, 2004) suggest that there may be some basic similarities across most cultures that should not be lost in our quest to identify differences. Because emotion-related regulation is necessary to act in accordance with social norms regarding emotion-related behavior, it is likely to be valued in nearly all cultures. Therefore, skills that contribute to the ability to modulate emotion and its expression, and importantly, allow one to do so in a flexible way so that people can regulate in a manner that is acceptable in their culture, are likely to predict positive developmental outcomes, especially in structured and socially and/or politically stable cultures.

References


COMMENTARY: Emotion Studied in Cultural-Developmental Psychology

James A. Russell
Department of Psychology, Boston College
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, USA
E-mail: james.russell@bc.edu

The study of human development and the study of culture complement one another beautifully. Human development depends on its cultural context. And culture exerts its influence on individuals over the full course of their development. Developmental psychology and Cultural psychology have a natural affinity for one another. Might this affinity result in an offspring, a Cultural-Developmental Psychology? One sign of major scientific progress is often the emergence of a new field, born of two parent fields. Cognitive Neuroscience, for example, now has a research agenda different from either parent, Neuroscience or Cognitive Science. Similarly, Social Cognition is now a full fledged area of Psychology, different from either Social or Cognitive Psychology. Of course, for many years, some developmental psychologists have examined development in its cultural context, and some cultural psychologists have examined development. Still, the emergence of a new field of Cultural-Developmental Psychology, with its own history, agenda, and institutional and social structures, might provide an impetus to the neglected study of development in its cultural context.

The four articles in this Newsletter illustrate how a Cultural-Developmental Psychology can contribute to a better understanding of one phenomenon, emotion. Trommsdorff expands the theory of independent and interdependent selves (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) to provide hypotheses about cultural differences in the development of the experience and understanding of emotion. Needless to say, not all of her hypotheses have to be verified for this theory to be useful. For example, Trommsdorff suggested that whether positive and negative feelings are opposites varies with culture. There are data that question this hypothesis (Yik & Russell, 2006), but the important point is the exciting possibilities in her way of thinking about emotion. Wang provides data on cultural differences in adult/child conversations and the resulting differences in emotion knowledge. It is this kind of detail that bridges from the abstract notion of “culture” to the individual, in this case the individual’s knowledge of emotion. Camras and Fatani recall two different assumptions commonly made about individual differences in the expression of emotion. Some have taken such differences to be aspects of innate temperament; others have taken them to be the result of cultural differences. Studying adopted children, Camras and Fatani found clear evidence for the role of culture—and thus an argument in favor of a Cultural-Developmental Psychology in the study of emotion.

Cole and Tan point to methodological and conceptual difficulties that arise when culture is treated as a monolithic entity. As the individual develops, culture is present only through the impact of specific events and persons. Thus, at the point of impact, culture is heterogeneous. Their well articulated and convincing critique lays the groundwork for a more useful conceptualization of culture in the study of emotion. A similar line of reasoning applies to emotion. First, note how writers in this Newsletter frame their questions and answers about emotion. We read of cultural differences in the experience of, the expression of, knowledge of, memory of, body manifestation of, and regulation of—emotion. Researchers then assess experience, expression, knowledge, etc. but the emotion itself implicitly remains separate from what is examined. Of course, separation of emotion from memory and knowledge is reasonable, but it is troubling when emotion per se is separated from all observable events. This way of framing the issues leads researchers to assume that even if all the observable components of emotion vary over the course of development, or vary from one culture to the next, or vary from one occasion to another, even so, the emotion itself remains the same. With this assumption, the claim that emotion is universal—that it

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remains the same despite developmental and cultural differences — is not an empirical finding, but a presupposition. This way of thinking is part of common sense and part of most psychological conceptions of emotion, but is not inevitable.

Put differently, the presupposition is that emotion is an entity separate from all its manifestations, causes, consequences or other processes. At the dawn of scientific psychology, William James challenged this “entity” view of emotion. The entity view lends itself to thinking of emotions as having an essence; they are universal and eternal. Development simply brings them out. When emotion is assumed to be an entity, culture can alter its causes, or consequences, or manifestations, but cannot alter the essence of the emotion itself. From this perspective, development of emotion is like the development of a role of film; the images were already there, pre-formed, waiting to be brought out. To use Cole and Tan’s term, emotion as an entity is monolithic. The entity assumption makes emotion a mystery, defying scientific analysis. It is time to question the empirical basis for this assumption.

And it is time to examine alternatives. For example, suppose that, rather than a monolithic entity, emotion is the varying pattern among what are now called its causes, consequences, manifestations, and other related processes (elsewhere I have elaborated one such account; Russell, 2003). Just as we no longer consider life a force or entity separate from biochemical processes, we need not consider emotion a force or entity separate from its associated processes. Each emotion token (i.e., a particular occurrence at a particular time and place) is the sum of and pattern among these various processes, rather than a separate entity hidden behind them. The specific processes that occur on a given occasion are not the output of a single fixed entity. Rather, each process has its own causal history and is only partly influenced by the other processes. They and the pattern among them are constructed on the spot to suit the given circumstances. This perspective affords a very different way of understanding emotion and a different research agenda to a Cultural-Developmental Psychology. Our task is to understand each process and the pattern among processes as they develop in their cultural context.

One might object that abandoning the idea that emotion is a homogeneous entity leaves us without a solid ground to stand on. Emotion as a shifting pattern leaves us without a definition of emotion. What could be its defining features? Of course, a definition of emotion has been elusive from an entity perspective as well. Emotion is an everyday term rather than a scientific one. In my view, emotion is a fuzzy category that admits a variety of phenomena, from a flicker of amusement to eternal love, from revulsion to apathy, with no sharp border separating emotion from non-emotion.

References
These will be the last Notes I write as President of ISSBD. In July, on the occasion of the Biennial Meetings in Melbourne, I will hand over my office to Anne Petersen, the current President Elect. I have enjoyed my term as President, and before that as President Elect, and will no doubt enjoy the coming two years as Past President. Certainly I look forward to working with Anne, but as I have already told her, she will find me very supportive but very much in the background as I spend more time with my scholarly activities.

Meanwhile, back to business! In the past six months, since I last wrote to you, I have been as busy as ever keeping in contact with members of the Steering Committee and the Executive Committee to maintain the smooth running of the Society. In particular I have overseen the transfer of our journal, the International Journal of Behavioral Development (IJBD) and the Newsletter to our new publishers, Sage, and their take-over of several important administrative tasks of the Society. Related to this I have had regular contact with our new Acting Treasurer and Membership Secretary, Marcel van Aken who took over from Fred Vondracek at the beginning of this year (formal elections for these offices cannot be held before 2007). Coinciding with the take-over by Sage of some of the more routine tasks such as the collection of membership dues, Marcel has been busy familiarizing himself with his duties and helping Sage come to grips with some of the intricacies of the Society’s dues system – not an easy time and my thanks to Marcel for his conscientious handling of all such matters.

On the subject of the Society, its finances, and Sage, I was delighted to hear that, as I had intended by the whole enterprise of looking for a better deal related to IJBD and to outsource some of the Society’s administrative tasks, the ISSBD coffers are currently standing at around £750k, which probably represents the healthiest they have been in the history of the Society. Certainly when I took over as President in 2002 the official balance was less than £400k. This magnificent state-of-affairs is due in no small part to the deal we were able to negotiate with Sage which gave us not only a very generous one-off signing fee (equivalent to 50% of the total revenue of the Society in 2004) but also guarantees ISSBD a significantly better annual income than previously. In addition, over and above the guaranteed income it is very likely that the successful marketing strategies of Sage will result in an even higher annual return from the Journal. Indeed the first advance royalty payment from Sage (£75k—approximately $135k) has already exceeded the guaranteed base amount by almost 10%, something that Sage attributes to the remarkable success of their Psychology Collections which includes IJBD. I should add that the main reason I am so happy to be able to report such financial success is because of what this means for the work of the Society, if not for the Society itself. At a time when many like Societies and their journals are struggling to stay afloat in precarious financial waters, ISSBD seems set for a pretty secure future. Healthy finances also mean we can continue and even increase our support of projects such as regional workshops, our Biennial Meetings and pre-conference workshop, the Journal Donation Project and other such endeavours—all of which are prone to rising financial demands as general costs, such as travel, increase. I should therefore like to take this opportunity to thank all those at Sage and ISSBD who have been involved in making this venture such a success.

With regard to membership, there is more good news related to activities I have been encouraging concerning the future health of the Society. In November 2005 we had 1040 paid-up ISSBD members—an excellent figure given that 2005 was an off-census year and bearing in mind that it had reportedly fallen to just shy of 800 in 2003. A large part of this rise in membership can be related to the hugely successful 2004 Biennial Meetings in Ghent, organized by Leni Verhoofstad-Denève and her team, which resulted in membership rising to 1139, the highest since 1996. Perhaps something with the old, low figures was actually wrong, but I’m sure our policy of giving incentives (a combination of congress dues and membership) resulted in an actual increase. Apart from this, however, I also spent a considerable amount of time writing personally to very many people who had not renewed their membership despite repeated reminders. This was also successful and brought quite a few ‘lost sheep’ back into the fold. All in all the message is that the Society is in pretty good shape with regard to membership although there is never room for complacency. In particular we need to encourage greater diversity in our membership, especially from the less economically secure regions. Our policy of diversified membership fees according to geographical location has helped but I have tried to help further, for example, by encouraging the regional workshops in Africa to include membership for the participants as part of the workshop package.

In general, my office (particularly Verona Christmas-Best, who has worked with me on negotiations with Sage since they started in 2003) has continued to work closely with Sage during the transition period. There have been, as might be expected with such a vast undertaking, one or two hiccups (primarily regarding the collection of membership dues) but overwhelmingly things have gone according to plan and I am more than happy with progress to date. In March we hosted a meeting here in Jena between members of the Sage editorial team (Michael Carmichael, Senior Editor, Psychology, and Kerry Barner, Publishing Editor) the new Acting Treasurer and Membership Secretary, Marcel van Aken, Karina Weichold (one of the new Newsletter editors—more about which later), Verona, and myself. This was an opportunity for two principle members of the Sage team to meet representatives of ISSBD, and to be able to discuss issues such as membership and the Newsletter.

Returning to Sage’s takeover of various ISSBD administrative tasks—one area that featured strongly in our negotiations was the Society’s website. I had long wanted that ISSBD should make better use of internet access and outreach and the transfer to Sage was an ideal opportunity to move towards achieving this. The new website went live on January 4th, 2006 and if you have renewed your membership for 2006 (as you should have done) you will have received instructions on how to access the newly designed secure area on the site, where you can change your password, and access and change/update your personal details. Emails were sent to all ISSBD members by Sage giving their account number, email and password. Where emails failed or where members did not have an email address, letters were sent providing instructions as to how these members could access the secure site. Essentially, members need to set up an email account and forward their email address to Sage so that they can allocate an ID number, etc. To date, letters have been sent out to approximately 280 members—200 of whom had email addresses which failed to deliver, and 80 who did not have an email address. If despite all these efforts you haven’t yet received your membership information then please contact our main link person at Sage, Kerry Barner, at kerry.barner@sagepub.co.uk.

The idea of the secure site is also to allow on-line voting in future elections. Apart from streamlining the election process, the aim is also to encourage greater membership participation.
in nominations and elections and in ISSBD matters in general. Consequently, it is important that members have access to the secure area and that they have a working email account. We have now made it very easy for members to make sure that their personal details, especially email address, are up to date, and I’d like to ask you all to make sure you remember to make use of this facility. We want to increase the use of the site (and email in general) to contact members and this can only be effective if the email addresses we have are correct.

In January the first issue of the new look IJBD (developed by Sage in collaboration with the Editor, Bill Bukowski, and my office) was published and made available on-line. I find the new cover layout particularly attractive—there is continuity with previous versions of journal design yet at the same time bringing a fresher, eye-catching look. What I find even more exciting, however, are the facilities offered to ISSBD members by Sage Journals Online. Via the members-only portal on the ISSBD web site (enter your membership ID, email address, and password to get access), Sage Journals Online allows articles from the latest and all back issues of IJBD to be retrieved, particular articles to be searched for, other like articles to be found, and many other facilities that I cannot detail here. The best thing is for you to explore for yourself. However, one innovative function I find particularly useful is the ability to find citations to an article and even to sign up to be alerted when an article is cited. This is done via a service called CiteTrack Alerts. This also provides email-based alerts when new articles matching a given search criteria are published in our journal (International Journal of Behavioral Development online) or when particular International Journal of Behavioral Development online articles are cited by new articles from a designated set of 888 journals (see http://journals.sagepub.com/help/ijjinks.dtl for participating journals). All in all, do try out the new facilities offered, and do let us (or Sage) know what you find particularly well designed or where you think improvements can be made.

You might recall in my last Notes I mentioned the digitalization of back issues of the Journal (going back to the journal’s inception in 1978) with the intention that eventually all articles ever published in IJBD will be available on-line and the fact that two issues had been lost from my collection over time. Following my request for anyone with these missing issues to come forward I was contacted by Pierre Dasen who kindly lent them to Sage to complete the digitized archive. Many thanks Pierre.

As you know, IJBD is sent free to selected institutions in regions of the world that have economic challenges severely restricting access to scientific journals. This program, the Journal Donation Project, is supported by ISSBD. Through Sage, however, IJBD will also feature as part of the PERI initiative. This is run by the INASP (International Network for the Availability of Scientific Publications) and has the aim of making academic journals available to academic, health and governmental libraries in the developing world (see www.inasp.info). For a very small fee it provides a qualifying institution in one of the specified countries with electronic access to all Sage journals included in the programme. Although royalties earned from the programme will be negligible, it will increase dissemination of IJBD in the developing world and enable it to reach a new audience, which should lead to increased usage and hopefully also to increased submissions. That said, as I have already mentioned, the economics of whatever ISSBD does should not always be the principle consideration. I feel strongly that involvement in such projects is part of ISSBD’s mission to expand the outreach of its work to include as many people as possible and that, in turn, it will reflect well on the Society.

The Society’s mission has been extremely busy in furthering our workshop program. In particular I have worked with Mambwe Kasese-Hara on the proposal to hold a seventh regional workshop in Africa later this year. Located at the University of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg, South Africa, the main theme of the workshop is ‘Developing Research Capacity in Human Development’. It aims to bring African scholars from as many African countries as possible together with experts from a broad international community to exchange ideas and to reflect on some of the basic concepts and methods in development research. Efforts to articulate both local and global approaches to research in human development are emphasized but the overriding focus of the workshop will be on a critical engagement with current research affecting human development and its consequences. The workshop will also be an opportunity for ISSBD membership in South Africa to grow by attracting new members from the huge pool of psychologists working in various academic institutions in South Africa. The workshop proposal, which has been extensively and repeatedly revised, was put before the EC for approval. I am happy to report that in principle and pending some further amendments, the workshop has been approved. It is expected to take place in the Fall this year.

A proposal was also recently received from Brett Laursen and Silvia Koller for a second workshop in South America. Entitled, ‘Advancing Inter-American Collaboration in Human Development Research, Methodology, and Training’, the workshop is planned for July 2007 and will be hosted by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil. The proposed workshop is intended to provide opportunities for international discourse on theories, methods, and training designed to foster international collaboration on research that promotes successful development among the children and youth of the region. A special emphasis will be placed on methodological training in areas with relevance to social policy. This will include how socioeconomic factors such as poverty and parent education affect functioning and school achievement; the psychosocial and cognitive developmental consequences associated with social change and immigration; variations in cultural practices concerning schooling, mental health services, and parenting; and successful program design and evaluation for treatment and intervention studies. The draft proposal and budget were put before the EC and have received an in principal yes, pending some open questions that will be resolved soon.

Finally with regard to workshops in planning, I have also maintained contact with John Schulenberg over the workshop ‘Developmental Transitions as Turning Points: An International Workshop on Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives’ (organized together with Jari Nurmi and Lisa Crocket) proposed for spring 2007. (Originally scheduled for 2006 it was moved to 2007 primarily to avoid a clash with the 2006 ISSBD Biennial Meetings in Melbourne.) This workshop has been under discussion for some time now and the slow progress has been due to various reasons beyond my control. Although agreed to in principle pending approval of a well-justified budget for the workshop, I haven’t received anything new in writing recently although John Schulenberg has made contact and asked for a little more breathing space before any further decisions can be taken.

As well as being occupied with the various workshops, I have also been busy concerning the 2006 Biennial Meetings of ISSBD to be held in Melbourne, Australia in July. Things are progressing well and it is now just the fine tuning to take care of. Do remember to keep checking developments via the website http://www.issbd2006.com.au/index.shtml. By the way, as I reported in earlier Notes, at this congress we have for the first time a clear agreement about the sharing of potential losses (not to exceed our start-up loan) and profits related to Biennial Meetings—we are confident of the latter, but will see that the
lion share of what ISSBD might earn will be invested in activities for our membership in and outside of Australia.

Plans for the pre-conference workshop on “Development in context: Making best use of existing longitudinal data” are also proceeding well. As with the previous Meeting in Ghent, this will target young scholars, especially those from countries where the local financial situation hinders participation in high-ranking international conferences such as ours. Financial support has already been secured from the Kellogg and Jacob’s Foundations to enable the attendance of up to 20 such scholars. I look forward to meeting as many of you as possible in Melbourne.

Finally, I would like to return to our search for Newsletter Editors to take over from Joan Miller and Xinyin Chen who officially stood down at the end of 2005, although they agreed to continue until the spring Newsletter 2006 is published. I am very happy to be able to report that the search is over and we have two new Editors who are already hard at work putting together the Fall newsletter. They are Bonnie Barber of Murdoch University, Perth, Australia, and Karina Weichold, of the University of Jena, Jena, Germany. Bonnie’s research interests include adolescent and young adult social relationships across life transitions, long-term benefits of organized sport and activity participation, and positive development in divorced families. Karina’s research interests include adolescent alcohol-consumption in times of social change, biopsychosocial mechanisms of maladaptation during puberty and adolescence, preventive interventions against adolescent problem behaviour. I wish both editors the very best of luck in their endeavours and would just like to urge members to remember to liaise with them and to use the Newsletter as a form of communication with the membership of ISSBD as a whole. The editors can be contacted under either B.Barber@murdoch.edu.au, or Karina.Weichold@uni-jena.de

It only remains now for me to thank my fellow officers on the Steering Committee and on the Executive Committee for all their help and support during my time as President. In particular I should like to thank Jari Nurmi, our Secretary General, who has been very active on ISSBD’s behalf, particularly recently in his collaboration with Sage over the new website and its use for the upcoming elections, as well as overseeing the elections in 2005 and his many other duties. I shall be as busy as ever over the coming months working with our colleagues in Australia to make sure the Meetings are the best yet, and finishing the Guidelines for Managing Biennial Meetings that I have promised to provide as a support for those considering making congress bids in the future.

I hope these Notes find you having made a good start to the New Year; I have enjoyed having this opportunity to communicate with you all and to reflect regularly on what has happened during the past four years. I have done my very best for ISSBD and think I can confidently say that I am able to hand over a healthy, vibrant, and strong Society to the new President, Anne Petersen, later this year. Once again, I look forward to meeting as many of you as possible in Melbourne—I know it’s going to be great!
Memoir: Giyoo Hatano

It is with deepest regret that I write to inform his ISSBD colleagues about the death of Giyoo Hatano. Giyoo died of pneumonia on the 13th of January, 2006, at age 70.

Giyoo obtained his B.A., Masters, and Ph.D. degrees from the Department of Educational Psychology, University of Tokyo, where he completed his university education in 1966. He began his professional career at the College of Education, University of Tokyo, in 1963. From 1967–1988 he rose to become a full professor of psychology at Dokkyo University. He remained at Dokkyo University as Professor of psychology and cognitive science until 1995. Following his retirement from Dokkyo University, he held positions in Educational Psychology and Human Development, first at Keio University and then at the University of the Air.

Giyoo’s research covered a wide span of topics at the nexus of education and human development although the specific foci of interest underwent a number of changes over his four and a half decades of research. Initially he and his colleagues concerned themselves with topics closely related to a mixture of classroom tasks (particularly mathematics), Piagetian-style problem solving and ways to foster learning through modifications of the social organization of the classroom. In 1977 he and his colleagues published the first of a series of influential studies of the abacus as a cognitive tool and the implications of the acquisition of expertise in abacus use on such basic cognitive processes as memory in addition to the effect of such expertise in normal classroom learning of mathematics. A few years later he published an especially influential paper on the development of adaptive expertise with his life long colleague, Kayoko Inagaki.

Over the next two decades Giyoo widened his portfolio of interests to include analyses of the properties of music, the naïve theories of preschoolers (particularly in the domain of biology), and, most recently, the ways in which apparently innate, domain-specific naïve theories and participation in cultural practices work in a complementary way to support cognitive development. He never lost interest in the problems that interested him as a young man, but, rather continually broadened the profile to the topics he encompassed at the same time that he deepened his (and our) understanding of the topics with which he began.

Giyoo had an exceptional ability to bridge different perspectives and different cultures. He consistently rejected either/or thinking, seeking points of contact between cultural-historical, cognitive, and information processing approaches to cognition and cognitive development. He approached empirical research in a similar manner adopting experimental, observational and discourse analytic approaches to fit the scientific problem at hand.


For those of us who were lucky enough to know and work with him, Giyoo will be missed for his gentle criticism coupled with warm support. He was the kind of scholar and human being whom anyone could admire and seek to emulate. For those who know Giyoo Hatano from his published work, it is clear that contemporary scholarship on human development and the learning sciences has suffered a grievous loss.

Michael Cole
Department of Communication
University of California, San Diego
USA
### MAJOR CONFERENCES OF INTEREST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Conference</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Location: Antalya, Turkey</td>
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<td>Email: <a href="mailto:eara2006@ebuline.com">eara2006@ebuline.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006 July 12–16</strong></td>
<td>29th Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP)</td>
<td>Barcelona, Spain</td>
<td><a href="http://ispp.org/meet.html">http://ispp.org/meet.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006 July 23–27</strong></td>
<td>Fourth Biennial International SELF Research Conference</td>
<td>Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA</td>
<td><a href="http://www.SELFconference.org">www.SELFconference.org</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Editorial**

**Editor**
Joan G. Miller  
ISSBD Newsletter  
Department of Psychology  
New School for Social Research  
New York, NY 10003, USA  
Email: millerj@newschool.edu  

**Editor**
Xinyin Chen  
ISSBD Newsletter  
Department of Psychology  
University of Western Ontario  
London, Ontario  
Canada N6A 5C2  
Email: xchen@uwo.ca  

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SAGE Publications Ltd  
1 Oliver's Yard  
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## Contents

**ISSBD SPECIAL SECTION**

CULTURE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Introduction to Culture and the Development of Emotions</td>
<td>Joan G. Miller and Xinyin Chen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Development of Emotions as Organized by Culture</td>
<td>Gisela Trommsdorff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Capturing the Culture in the Cultural Socialization of Emotion</td>
<td>Pamela M. Cole and Patricia Z. Tan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Developing Emotion Knowledge in Cultural Contexts</td>
<td>Qi Wang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Development of Emotional Expressivity and the Influence of Culture</td>
<td>Linda A. Campos and Serah S. Fotani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Commentary: Universals and Cultural Influences on Emotional Life</td>
<td>Michael Lewis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Commentary: Cultural Influences on Emotional Development: So Much to Do, So Little Time</td>
<td>Nancy Eisenberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Commentary: Emotion Studied in Cultural-Developmental Psychology</td>
<td>James A. Russell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Notes from the President</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Memoir: Giyoo Hatano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Major Conferences of Interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>